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Most political analysts failed to predict that the  only policy  "crises"  are able  to attract sufficient
election of 1980 would  be close;  few foresaw the  attention for  resolution.
landslide  that  would  bring major  changes  in the
policy-making  machinery.  The  results  surprised  Emerging Food  and Agricultural Policy  Crises
almost everyone.  Ronald Reagan carried  all but 6
states,  and  the  Republicans  won  the  Senate  for  Many  farm-sector  advocates  believe  strongly
the first time in a quarter century.  The balance of  that  the  case  for government  price  and  income
power  in  the  House  of  Representatives  also  protection  is  stronger  than  ever.  In  their  view,
shifted  toward  the  conservatives-Republicans  the  infrequent  high  prices  during the  1970s  have
gained  33  seats.  been more than offset by inflation in input prices,
Whether  these  dramatic  changes  portend  particularly  for energy.  They  contend  that  gov-
major changes  in food  and  agricultural  policy  is  ernment farm programs  actually protect consum-
still a question. An indication  should come  soon.  ers from themselves  by trading off slightly higher
The  policy framework  for  agriculture,  the  Food  prices now for more stable, perhaps lower, prices
and Agriculture Act of 1977, as amended,  expires  in  the future.  They  also  believe  that  most non-
in  1981.  The converging forces  that could lead to  farmers  are ignorant  of the  benefits  of the farm
modifications  in that framework  are the  subject  programs  and that all proposals  for change from
of this paper.'  outside traditional  agriculture  are subterfuge.
These  perceptions  are  quite  real.  They  are
powerful.  They  have  deep-seated  roots  and  are
THE  FOOD  POLICY  ENVIRONMENT  perpetuated  with  bits  and  pieces  of fact.  Such
FOR  THE  1980s  perceptions will continue to carry a great deal of
weight during the 1981 farm bill debate-and,  un-
The  notion  that  "new"  farm  legislation  will  fortunately,  in farm policy debates for some time
"replace"  the  1977 Act  can  be  dismissed.  Con-  to come.
gressional  and  executive  branch  efforts  simul-  But  economic  pressures  reflect  reality,  not
taneously  to reduce  the role  of government,  cut  perceptions.  And the  facts overwhelmingly  sup-
taxes,  and  balance  the  budget  will  leave  little  port  a  conclusion  that  commercial  agriculture
time for protracted floor debates on other issues.  fared  quite  well  during  the  1970s  (Penn).  There
That  does  not mean  there  will  not be  a  1981  are strong indications  that the economic  position
farm  bill.  There  will  be;  it  probably  will  be  a  of farmers  will  continue  to  improve  relative  to
4-year  bill.  It does  mean  that  food  and  agricul-  the population  as  a whole  during the  1980s.
tural  programs  will not  receive  comprehensive  The  chronic  excess  capacity  problem  that
examination  in  1981  unless  doing  so contributes  characterized  the  sector  for a quarter of a cen-
to  the  solution  of broader  national  problems.  tury  following  World  War  II  has  largely  given
With  few  exceptions,  subsequently  discussed,  way to pressures for sustained increases  in trend
the bill should  extend the policy  framework em-  output.  Domestic  farmers  and  food  consumers
bodied  in  the  1977  act  and  its  subsequent  are  now  strongly  influenced  by  the  close  and
amendments.  growing  interdependence  of  agriculture  and
This prediction  is based  on  two factors.  First,  worldwide  economic  events.  Broad  national
the  changes  in  people-the  policy-making  ma-  policies  now  focus  on  agriculture  for continued
chinery-will  tend  to  slow  the  legislative  pro-  increases  in  exports,  help  in  producing  energy
cess,  at  least  for  a  time.  Second,  and  perhaps  from  renewable  resources,  and,  simultaneously,
most  important,  is  the  changing  policy-making  stability in  food prices.  The growing importance
process.  As the  nation's problems  have  become  of agriculture  will give  rise to  spirited policy de-
more  complex,  so  has  the process  for resolving  bates in these three areas  during the next several
them.  Debates  are frequently  so  protracted  that  years.
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TABLE  i.  Value of U.S. Foreign Trade for Ag-  Source:  Department  of Agriculture.
ricultural  and Nonagricultural  Products,  1930  to
1980,  Calendar Years.
Agriculral  Importance  of  Agricultural  Exports  allow the free movement  of internal prices to al-
Decade/Year  Eports  To  All  Exports  ToRearcptash  locate resources.  "Needed"  marginal purchases
billion  dollars)  - - - - - -percent  - - - - - - - are  made  without  much  apparent  regard  for
1930s  .8  30.6  10.5
1940s  23  223065  107price.  Taken together,  these efforts  by others to
1950s  3.6  22.3  11.4
1960s  5.9  216  13.9  stabilize  domestic  food  commodity  prices  shift
1970s  19.7  20.5  22.1  the  costs of increased prices  variability  to farm-
1976  23.0  20.3  24.1
1977  23.0  19.9  241.  ers and consumers  in the U.S.
1978  29.4  20.8  25.4
1979  34.7  19.  26.  The  expansion  of agricultural  exports  also in-
1980  (est)  40.5  19.3  29.1
creases  the  risk that commodity  price  and  farm
income fluctuations  will come from international
Source:  U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture  and  Council  of  income  fluctuations  will come from  international
Economic  Adviseprs.me  ad C  l of  political considerations.  The January,  1980,  deci-
sion  to ban  the sale  of certain agricultural  prod-
ucts to the  USSR had  little to do with economic
To accommodate  the increase  in farm exports,  policy.  Rather,  it  was  a  foreign  policy  action
the  area devoted  to  the  production  of crops  for  thought necessary because of the Soviet invasion
export  has  nearly  doubled.  At  times,  transport  of Afghanistan.
systems  and  grain  storage  facilities  have  been  The  growing variability  in prices  and farm  in-
pushed  nearly  to their physical limits.  However,  come that  will  come  with increasing  exports  in
export expansion remains  the most popular solu-  this  uncertain  economic  and  political  environ-
tion to continued  farm economic  prosperity.  ment  will  almost  certainly  give  rise  to  farmers'
No doubt, exports  have contributed  to the im-  demands for  public  "protection."  Doubters  can
proved  financial  position  of  (and  outlook  for)  look  to  the  Agricultural  Trade  Suspension  Ad-
farmers.  But,  when coupled  with the  disappear-  justment Act  of 1980 for supporting  evidence.
ance  of large  government-held  grain  stocks  and
the sustained nearly full use of the cropland base,  Energy Security. The second major area of po-
the increase  has  also  exposed  U.S. farmers  and  tential policy crisis for agriculture derives from a
consumers  to  an unaccustomed  degree  of com-  concern with energy security. The doubling of oil
modity price instability,  enough to make it a pol-  prices  in  1979  convinced  almost  everyone  that
icy problem (Figure  1). Part of this instability has  rising energy prices are not a transient problem.
been  the  result  of unpredictable  world  weather  Yet  as  with  grain,  the  needed  adjustments  not
conditions,  yet  much  of it  results  from policy-  only derive from the prospect of higher and more
our own and that of our trading partners.  variable  prices,  but  also,  at  times,  from  supply
Many  nations  insulate  their  economies  from  disruptions  that have little relationship to market
extreme fluctuations in commodity prices (Hath-  conditions.
away).  Some,  like  the  European  Community,  The effects of the evolving energy situation on
achieve price  stability as a by-product of policies  food and agriculture are not yet fully understood.
that  keep  domestic  prices  above  world  equilib-  On  the  one  hand,  higher  relative  energy  prices
rium  levels.  Others,  like  Canada  and  Australia,  increase  production  costs.  They  also  put  more
use  state  trading  agencies  to  help  stabilize  pressure on substitutes for energy inputs, primar-
prices-quantitative  restrictions  on  exports  are  ily land and water.  But energy use is only part of
routinely  imposed when  domestic price  stability  the picture.  Agriculture  is  now looked  to for in-
is  threatened.  Also,  an increasing  proportion  of  creases  in output that will facilitate  the  substitu-
the  total  grain  exported  is  going  to  centrally  tion  of renewable  resources  for  products  previ-
planned  and  developing  countries  that  do  not  ously made  from oil.
2The  benefits  from programs  that diversify  our  FIGURE  2.  Relative  Food Prices,  U.S.
energy  sources  are  doubtless  significant,  but,  RATIOV
much  like  expenditures  on  national  defense,  are  SEASONALLY  ADJUSTED
nearly  impossible  to  quantify.  Moreover,  if  in-
deed we have the "moral equivalent of war,"  the
usual economic feasibility studies become largely\  A
irrelevant.
However,  the  accountable  costs  of such  pro-
grams are not trivial.  For example,  current gaso-  10  o 
hol initiatives  imply the  need for about  370  mil-
lion bushels and a 5-percent incremental increase
in  the  area planted  to  corn  by  the  end  of  1982.
The  ethanol  produced  would  replace  about  1947  1950  1955  1960  1965  1970  1975  1980
60,000 barrels  of oil per day-about  1 percent of  ' Ratio  of implicit price  deflator  for food  to implicit price
current  oil imports.  The cost of producing  etha-  deflator for all personal  consumption  expenditures.
nol  and the  higher  corn price,  even  when offset  Source:  Department  of Commerce.
by the value of by-product feeds  and an increase
in  feedgrain  export  earnings,  imply  that the  na-
tion will pay nearly twice  the present world price  ent return of surpluses in  1976-77 helped support
for each barrel of foreign oil displaced.2 And with  this  notion.  Nevertheless,  food  prices  remained
the  incentives  already  authorized,  the  grain  re-  high  relative  to  other  prices,  and  there  is  little
quired  for  gasohol  could  more  than  double  by  evidence to  suggest  otherwise for the  1980s.
1985.  If  such  conditions  do  evolve,  as  now  seems
At  the  same  time,  periodically  high  sugar  likely,  consumers  will  be  pressing  for  policy
prices and the Southern Hemisphere's  expanding  changes  that  minimize  the  welfare  loss;  and  it
use  of  sugarcane  for ethanol  have  combined  to  will not matter which political party is in power.
increase  the  U.S.  demand  for corn  as  a  sweet-  Every  action,  whether  by  government  or  the
ener. The amount of corn used to produce sweet-  private  sector,  that  is  even  accused  of  putting
eners has increased  more than  60 percent  in five  upward  pressure  on  food  prices  will  be investi-
years  (USDA  Sugar  and  Sweetener  Report).  gated.  Tobacco,  rice,  peanut,  and  extra-long-
Corn  sweeteners  could  consume  700  million  staple cotton  programs  that, to  varying degrees,
bushels of corn by  1985.  Such an increase  would  still fix  land  use patterns  by  acreage  allotments
free some of the 1.2 million acres now devoted to  will  be  scrutinized.  Fruit and  vegetable  market-
sugar beet  production,  but the pressure  for pre-  ing  orders  that  sometimes  restrict  output  or
mium Corn  Belt cropland  would  intensify.  otherwise  control marketings  to  enhance  prices
Rising  energy  prices  are  also  increasing  the  will also be challenged. The challenge will extend
demand  for  natural fibers,  primarily  cotton.  As  to the restrictive trade policies that protect those
energy-based  synthetic  fibers  were  developed,  higher  prices.  There  will  be  policy  pressure  to
much  of the 40 million acres once planted  to cot-  remove the economic  penalties  now imposed  by
ton  became  available  for  other crops,  primarily  regulation on  the use of technologies  that would
soybeans.  But  since  1975,  cotton  acreage has in-  raise productivity  in the food system.  Grades and creased  steadily.  While  a significant  increase be-  standards  that  now  discourage  the  production
yond the current  14 million-acre level is unlikely,  and  processing  of foods  that  are  more  efficient
cotton will  not yield  acreage  to  other uses with-  users  of  increasingly  scarce  resources  are  also
out  significant changes  in relative prices.  likely  to  be  questioned.  While  debates  on  such
issues will be controversial,  they will nonetheless
Food Price Stability.  A third  area of potential  become  more numerous as  the costs of past poli-
policy  conflict-food  price  stability-derives  cies  become  increasingly  obvious.  The  debates
partly from the other two. The political visibility  may begin  in earnest during  1981.
of food inflation, when coupled  with the prospect  I  am  not  persuaded  by  those  who  say  such
for rising and more volatile  commodity prices al-  changes  will  not  occur.  History  teaches  that
ready  discussed,  could  well  make  it  the  single  while regulatory structures  tend to slow resource
most  important  factor  in  shaping  the  policy  adjustments,  they  do  not  stop  them.  The  eco-
agenda for food and  agriculture  in the  1980s.  nomic  pressures  to  make  the  changes  I  have
The evidence already  suggests that the 25-year  mentioned  exist  already;  it  is just a question  of
real decline in food prices had ended by the early  time.  Besides,  it is likely that the policy pressure
1970s  (Figure  2).  When  food  prices  soared  in  to  change  agricultural  programs  will  come  in-
1973,  many  economists  saw  it  as  a  temporary  creasingly  from  broader-based  proposals  to deal
deviation  from the longer-term  trend. The appar-  with  the nation's macroeconomic  performance.
2
The  key to this  calculation  is the consideration  of the effect  of higher average grain  prices for all uses including domestic animal feed use.  A 5? per bushel  increase in the corn  price  alone  would  add  about  $215  million  to  domestic  livestock  production costs  (4.3  billion  bushes@  .05 = $215  million).
3SOME  SPECIFIC  PROGRAM  ISSUES  costs of avoiding the macroeconomic  side effects
of extreme  price  shocks.
The policy areas just discussed,  when coupled  Government  policy  can  alter  the  outcome  of
with  the  crisis-oriented  policy  process,  lead  to  the  storage  decision  by  changing  the  expected
the identification  of three areas for potential pro-  selling price, reducing the storage cost, or reduc-
grammatic  change during the next several years.  ing  the relative rate  of return  on  the investment
Each  involves  competing  national  goals  and/or  of funds from sales at the current price. Reaching
the  relatively  visible  expenditure  of federal  tax  agreement  on  whether  or  how  government
dollars.  In  each  case,  decisions  are  needed  in  should influence the grain storage decision is ex-
1981  because  existing  statutory  authority  ex-  tremely  difficult.  However,  there  is  general
pires.  agreement  that  public  programs  should  utilize
market forces to the  extent possible.
1.  The  relationship  between  Government-  The farmer-owned  reserve program represents
supported  commodity  reserves  and our ap-  a pragmatic solution to the grain storage dilemma
parent  unqualified  policy  of continued  ex-  (Burnstein).  It has  been  a popular,  flexible,  and
port expansion  ("more  is better")  is  likely  reasonably  efficient stock management tool. The
to be reviewed over the next several years.  nonrecoverable  taxpayer  costs  have  been  pay-
That debate  could begin  this year.  ments for storage and interest costs on Commod-
ity  Credit Corporation  (CCC)  loans  extended  to
2.  There  is  considerably  less  uncertainty  farmers  using  the  reserve.  Sales  from  the  re-
about  the  likelihood  of a  dairy  policy  de-  serve, above the minimum "release"  price, have
bate.  The  price  support  and  marketing  been  subject  to  the  same  market  forces  that
order programs  have obvious and direct re-  would  prevail  if the  stocks  were  privately  fi-
lationships  to food price  inflation  and bud-  nanced.
get costs, which make them visible and thus  Nevertheless,  there  are  some  difficult,  unan-
ripe for debate.  swered  questions,  commodity  coverage,  size,
and  operational  procedures  being  the  most  im-
3.  The  third  area,  which  has  already  been  portant.
targeted  by  both the  Secretary  of Agricul-  At  present,  the  program  is  available  only  to
ture  and  the  Chairman  of the  Senate  Ag-  producers  of  wheat,  rice,  and  feedgrains.  Re-
riculture  Committee,  is  food  assistance.  serves have also been  suggested for other impor-
Here the issue is fundamentally that of bud-  tant  export  commodities,  cotton and  soybeans,
get cost.  for example (Motes).  Such reserves might help to
build  export markets  over time,  and they  would
Grain Reserves  and Export Policy  probably  help  to stabilize prices.  But the  macro-
effects  of price  variability  in these  markets  are
As  mentioned,  increased  exports  continue  to  less obvious  than with  feedgrains,  and  it  is  still
be  the  most  popular  solution  for  price  and  in-  not  entirely  clear  how  much  government-sup-
come  problems in agriculture.  It is considered to  ported reserves for these commodities would add
be  the "free  market"  solution.  But export  mar-  to privately financed  stocks.
kets  are  not  free  markets,  and,  assuming  that  Optimal reserve  size is also a difficult and still
they  are, risks exposing the food and farm sector  unanswered  question. There is a level of reserves
to unnecessary,  destabilizing variability  in prices  that will provide  cost-effective  price stabilization
and income. Also the nation,  in time, will have to  in most situations, but the exact level appropriate
deal  with the impending  depletion  of natural  re-  for  any  one  year  changes  with  supply  and  de-
sources  now  being  exaggerated  by  its  policy  of  mand  conditions.  And  short-run  competing
maximizing  exports (Batie and Healy).  These are  pressures,  partly  related to the existence of mul-
both farm and  food concerns.  tiple program goals,  complicate attempts to settle
on  a specific  target quantity.
Commodity Reserves.  Unless  attitudes  about  Other questions pertain to the operation of the
embargoes  change  dramatically,  reserve  stocks  reserve  program.  Most  debates  in  this  area  will
seem  the  only  realistic  source  of  protection  continue  to  focus  on  when  and  how  stocks  are
against the inflationary  price rises that otherwise  released  for  sale  and on the  types  of incentives
occur  during periods  of short  supply.  They also  made  available to encourage  use of the program.
cushion  price  declines  in  temporary  periods  of  In general,  the answers  to all these questions will
overproduction.  depend  on  whether  the  reserve  program  is  per-
If information  and credit markets  were perfect  ceived  primarily  as  a tool to raise prices  and in-
and if there  were no macroeconomic  (i.e., "pub-  crease  farm  income  or  to  cushion  the  sector
lic  good")  side  effects, private  markets could  be  against price  shocks.
relied  on  to  hold  the  needed  stocks.  But  such
markets  are  not perfect.  Nor is  it reasonable  to  The Reduced Need for Subsidies. The improv-
expect  that  private  investors  will  assume  the  ing  economic  health  of the  nation's  farmers  re-
4duces the need for programs  that  subsidize their  greater  output; consumers  have benefitted  from
income.  The  growing  importance  of exports  in-  lower food prices.  Now that exports account for
creases the likelihood that the benefits of certain  a large,  and growing,  share of farm income,  it is
farm subsidy  programs will  accrue to our export  less  evident  that  such  subsidies  are  desirable
customers.  Taken  together,  these  observations  public  policy.
suggest,  first,  that  grain  sold  from  the  reserve  To  avoid  unintended  transfers  of  uncompen-
should  be priced  high  enough to  cover  not only  sated  national  wealth  to  our export  customers,
the costs of grain productions,  but also,  if possi-  the resources  committed to agriculture  will need
ble,  program  costs; and,  second,  that the incen-  proper pricing. For example,  this means that our
tives to place grain in reserve should be no great-  underground  water resources,  once thought to be
er  than  necessary  to  meet  the  domestic  price  virtually  unlimited,  should probably  be priced to
stabilization  objective.  Present  policy,  including  reflect  their  limited  availability  (U.S.  Govern-
administrative practices and legal authority, does  ment  Accounting  Office).  It also means  that  the
not serve  either of these objectives  as  well as  it  price  of grain  should  reflect  the  full  costs  of
might.  transporting  it  to  export  terminals.  Within  this
For example,  current  law requires  the  waiver  context,  taxpayer  subsidies  for  grain  transport
of  interest  normally  paid  by  farmers  on  CCC  systems  become more  questionable.
loans and the taxpayer payment of grain storage.  Where  all of this  is likely  to take us  in  1981  is
Consequently,  prices for grain  sold  from  the re-  unclear.  The positions of various interest groups
serve  do  not now  have to reflect  carrying costs.  are  still quite  far  apart.  The  adverse  macroeco-
If the  grain  is  sold  at a  lower  price  than  is  re-  nomic (and  political)  consequences  of the  rising
quired to cover carrying costs,  export customers  and  more  volatile  food  prices  often  associated
benefit  disproportionately.  In part  they  benefit  with increasing exports have generated proposals
because  American  taxpayers  subsidize  the  stor-  for state  trading. The growing depletion of natu-
age of grain,  and they  also benefit because  lower  ral  resources  has  revived  talk  of  export  taxes.
average prices imply the need for larger reserves.  Such proposals  are  not  likely  to  go  far:  mainly
However,  if grain  from  the  reserve  is  sold  at  a  they  conflict  with  a  deep-seated  economic  phi-
price  that  covers  both  production  and  program  losophy.  However,  proposals  to  eliminate  sub-
costs  (which  is  quite  likely,  given  the  inelastic  sidies  for input use  (including transportation)  or
nature of the demand), farmers receive a windfall  product  sales  are  not  so  constrained.  Farmers
that  may be  larger  than  necessary  to  reach  the  would oppose such changes,  but from a national
price  stabilization  objective,  policy perspective,  they seem far superior to the
However,  requiring  farmers  to  pay  storage  alternatives.  And  they  are  consistent  with  the
costs and full interest  on CCC loans would prob-  growing  notion  that  prices  should  be  relied  on
ably result in reserves  too small to gain the price  more,  and government  less,  for resource  alloca-
stabilization  objective.  But  if imperfect  agricul-  tion.
tural credit markets  are the most  serious imped-
iment to producer grain  storage,  the higher CCC  Dairy Policy
loans for grain entering the reserve  might be  suf-
ficient to attract the desired stocks in most years.  Dairy  policy  is  the  most  likely  candidate  for
The  most efficient  way  to  operate  the  program  contentious farm policy  debate  in  1981.  The  im-
would be to require farmers to bid for the right to  mediate  problem  areas  are  the  level  of,  and
place  grain  into  reserve.  Under such  a  scheme,  method for determining, price support, as well as
farmers  offering  to  store  a  specific  quantity  of  the  unresolved  federal  order  policy  issues.  In
grain  at  the  lowest  "price"  (i.e.,  taxpayer  sub-  fact,  if program  actions  are  consistent  with  the
sidy)  would be granted  authorized  entry.  announced  emphasis  on  deregulation,  those  is-
The flexibility  granted by  the Agricultural Act  sues may get considerable attention from the new
of  1980,  which authorizes  special  (higher)  loans  administration.
for grain  entering  the  reserve,  might be  used to
implement  such a plan.  Nevertheless,  legislative  Price Support Program. Milk remains the only
changes would be needed to require the farmer to  major commodity  whose  price  is  supported  as  a
pay for storage  and  interest.  specified percentage  of parity. While basic statu-
In  addition  to  grain  reserves,  government  tory  authority  provides  flexibility  in  setting  the
policies have  subsidized  the use  of key  agricul-  support price  between  75  and 90 percent  of par-
tural inputs.  Cost  sharing programs  for soil con-  ity,  the  1977  Act made  80 percent  the minimum
servation,  land development,  improved  soil  fer-  and  required  a  semiannual  adjustment.  That au-
tility,  pest control,  and  prevention  of plant and  thority was extended in 1979 for two more years.
animal  diseases  have been commonplace.  Water  There  is  widespread,  albeit  not  unanimous,
projects and natural disaster protection  programs  agreement  that  the  1977  Act  removed  "too
have  reduced  to a considerable  degree  the risks  much"  administrative  flexibility  and  that  the
of farming in the South and West.  Such programs  support  price  has  been  "too  high"  since  then.
have  reduced  production  costs  and  encouraged  The  removal of a  near-record  6.5 percent  of the
5total  milk production  during  1979-1980  at a net  one  that  will  be  resisted  by  dairy  farmers  (and
CCC cost of about $1.0 billion is frequently  used  perhaps  the  administration  for  budgetary  rea-
as  evidence  to  support  the  claim  (USDA Dairy  sons),  would  be  to revert  to  basic  statutory  au-
Situation).  thority  (i.e.,  75 to  90  percent  of parity).  Such  a
Frankly,  and  unfortunately,  that  so-called  "solution"  will be only temporary.  Until the milk
"evidence"  misses  the  point.  There  have  been  price  support  is rationalized  in a context consis-
times during the past decade when  support price  tent  with  contemporary  agricultural  policy  and
was  low  relative to  the cost  of producing  milk.  tied to movements  in the cost of producing  milk,
The  real  economic  policy  problem  is  that  the  with  appropriate  adjustments  for changes  in  de-
dairy  price  support  decision  is  now  tied  to  mand, this  issue will  not disappear.
movements  in a price-based  index  that has  little
relation either to the cost of producing milk or its  Marketing Orders  for Milk. The current federal
demand.  As  an example,  feed  costs,  which  ac-  order system evolved  from the  economic  condi-
count for about half the  cost of producing  milk,  tions that prevailed in the  1920s and  1930s,  when
have only a 12 percent weight in the parity index.  there  were  thousands  of  independent  farmers
This  was  not  a  serious  problem  when  grain  selling  milk  to  independent  processing  plants.
prices  were  stabilized  by  huge  government-  Since  independent  producers  could not regulate
owned  surpluses,  but when the  price  of grain  is  the  aggregate  flow  of product  to the  market  on
allowed  to  fluctuate,  a  milk  support  price  ad-  any given day, processors  were  able  to offer the
justment  based  on  parity  will  frequently  run  marginal value  for all  milk delivered.  In  short-
counter  to  changed  cost  conditions  for  dairy  supply  seasons,  the  marginal  value  was  high  in
farmers.  When  grain prices  increase  more  than  relation to production costs,  while at other times
other  prices,  the  parity  adjustment  will not  ac-  it was  low.
commodate  the  increase  in  milk  production  Market  orders  were  designed  to  stabilize  the
costs; when grain prices increase  less than other  fluid milk  price. Minimum  prices,  at least in the-
prices,  the parity adjustment  overstates  the  cost  ory,  were  established  as  the  prices  processors
increase.  The  evidence  is  fairly  convincing  that  would  have  to  pay  if  they  obtained  fluid  milk
variability  in  milk  production  was  increased  in  from  the  upper  Midwest  and  transported  it  to
the 1970s  because the price support decision was  their local markets, that  is, an alternative  supply
tied rigidly  to changes  in the  parity index (Babb  price.  This  regulatory  structure  remains  intact
and  Boynton).  That result  seems to  run counter  today.
to the purpose  of the  statute.  Almost  without exception, the  conditions that
The conceptual role of the milk price support is  gave  rise  to  this  regulatory  structure  no  longer
also difficult to articulate, at least within the con-  exist  (Fallert).  Dairy  cooperatives  handle  more
text  of  contemporary  agricultural  policy.  For  than  80 percent  of the  Grade  A  milk and  satisfy
several  years,  loan  prices  for  the  major  grains  67 percent of fluid milk handlers'  needs. The min-
have been  thought of as an economic  safety net,  imum federal  order prices  are badly out of align-
a price below which long-run productive capacity  ment  with  the  theoretical  alternative  supply
would  not  be  sustained.  Direct  payments  have  price,  and  "over-order  premiums"  are  now  re-
been  used  since the  1960s  to compensate for the  quired  in  many  markets  to  obtain  needed
income  loss  that  farmers  frequently  associate  supplies of fresh milk.  Most important, the tech-
with the  "low"  loan price policy.  nology  now exists to  make raw milk less perish-
That "safety  net" concept hardly has meaning  able  and  less  costly  to  transport,  thus,  less  ex-
for the current  dairy program.  In only  two years  pensive for consumers.
since  1948  (1973  and  1974)  has the  price paid  to  Nevertheless,  the  pricing  system  still  pre-
producers  of  manufactured  milk  exceeded  110  sumes the need for fresh raw milk  in all markets
percent of the support price (Novakovic).  In only  at  all times.  Fluid  products  made  commercially
five years  has it exceeded  105 percent of the sup-  from  manufactured  milk  ingredients  carry  an
port price.  For all practical purposes,  the support  economic  penalty.  Technologies  that  would  re-
price is the milk  price,  move  part  of the  water  from  raw  milk  prior to
As  with  reserves  and  export  policy,  it  is  not  transport  and  resale  as  a  fluid  product  are  also
clear just  how  the  milk  price  support  question  prohibited, either explicitly  or by economic  pen-
will  be  resolved  in  1981.  The  recent  relative  in-  alty.
crease in feed  costs will benefit dairy farmers in  The  availability  of such  technologies  and  the
the  debate;  but  the  focus  on  broader  national  rising  relative  costs  of  transportation  make  it
economic issues, including the size of the budget,  likely  that current  federal  order  regulations  will
will force  some  change.  A 1981  compromise that  come  under  increased  policy  pressure.  In  part,
retains  the reliance  on parity yet allows  substan-  this is because such  rules penalize consumers  by
tially more  flexibility  in  establishing the  support  limiting access  to lower cost alternatives to fresh
price is  a  strong  possibility.  The  semiannual  ad-  milk;  but,  eventually,  producers  will  also  see
justment is  almost certain  to be eliminated.  these  policies  as  limiting their potential  for eco-
The  "easiest"  solution  for  the  Congress,  but  nomic  gains.
6The  present  rigid  regulatory  structure  is  also  most direct  way  to reduce overall  program
out  of  step  with  the  times.  Airlines,  railroads,  costs  are  probably  the  least  equitable:  the
financial institutions,  and energy pricing  have  all  benefit  level  is  already  low  relative  to the
been  "deregulated."  In  an  era  when  increased  costs of feeding  a family.  The average food
reliance  on prices  as allocators is being sought,  it  stamp  family gets about 39  cents per meal.
is  not likely  that milk marketing  orders  will  sur-  USDA  estimates  that  a  moderate  income
vive  in their present form, at least not without a  household spends about $1  per meal to feed
formal debate.  a family of 4  (Longen and  Stucker).
Where this debate will lead (or just when  it will
take place) is not easy to predict. At some point,  3.  Participation  and  costs  are importantly  in-
the new administration  will have to make a deci-  fluenced  by  food price  inflation  and  unem-
sion on the year-old  Community  Nutrition  Insti-  ployment  (Longen  and  Stucker).  Even  if
tute's reconstituted  milk petition.  participation  had remained unchanged from
The  importance  of that decision should  not be  its  1977  level of 17 million,  fiscal  1980 costs
minimized.  It could  clarify  whether  it is  indeed  would  have  exceeded  the  spending  cap  by
national policy to ensure the continued  availabil-  nearly  $1  billion  because  of  higher  food
ity  of fresh  milk  as  the  only  commercial  fluid  prices.  Also,  USDA  estimates  that  each  1
dairy product, regardless of any changes in tech-  percent  increase  in  unemployment  adds
nology  or in consumer preferences.  from 750,000 to  1 million people to the pro-
gram:  the  1980  increase  in  unemployment
Domestic  Food Assistance  added about  1.5  million persons to the pro-
gram.
Food stamps have been the primary method of
domestic  food  assistance  for  about  a  decade  None  of this is  meant  to imply  that important
(Boehm,  Nelson,  and  Longen).  The  program  changes in the food  stamp program rules are  not
began  as  a pilot  project  in  1960  and  was  made  possible.  Quite  the  contrary.  A  number  of pro-
permanent  by  the  Food  Stamp  Act  of  1964.  gram  changes-almost  all  of  which  have  been
Today about 22 million Americans depend on the  debated  in recent years-are possible and would
program  wholly or in part for the food they buy.  help  make program  operations  more  defensible.
Program  costs have increased  from  $580 million  However,  the programmatic improvements  often
in  1970 to $9.5  billion in fiscal  1980.  discussed  when considering  budget-reducing op-
The food stamp program faces a crisis-charged  tions (i.e., mandatory work requirements,  halting
debate this year. The  1977 Act established spend-  eligibility for strikers, elimination of overlap with
ing  ceilings  of  $6.19  billion  for  fiscal  1980  and  child nutrition  programs,  elimination of program
$6.24  billion  for fiscal  1981,  mostly  because  of  fraud)  will not save  large  sums  of money.
uncertainty  about  the  participation  effects  of  The  only  real solution  to  the  spending  prob-
eliminating  the  purchase  requirement.  The  lem,  which  is also politically  viable,  is to reduce
spending ceilings were raised  last year-to  $9.49  food price inflation and lower the unemployment
billion  for  1980  and  $9.74  billion  for  1981.  The  rate. That conclusion will be difficult to accept in
1981  cap  will  be  inadequate  to  cover  program  most quarters today, yet it is the only conclusion
costs  at current benefit  levels. The new  adminis-  that  is consistent  with available  evidence.
tration  will  be  faced  with  a  tough  decision  on
food  stamp  spending  very early  in  its first  year.
The  difficulty  associated  with  meaningful  food  IMPLICATIONS  FOR SOUTHERN
stamp  reform is  highlighted  by the following:  AGRICULTURE
1.  Proposals to cut the pool of eligible partici-  The  growing  worldwide  demand  for food  and
pants  tend  to  be  very  expensive  polit-  fiber  should have  important  spillover  effects for
ically-large  numbers  of persons  must  be  southern  farmers.  Cotton,  soybeans,  poultry,
removed  before  significant  dollars  are  rice, feedgrain,  and perhaps even peanut produc-
saved  (USDA,  Characteristics  of  Food  ers  should  experience  gains  from  the  relative
Stamp Households:  February  1978).  Nearly  demand  shifts now expected for the  1980s.  But to
90 percent  of the 8 million households  now  facilitate  those shifts  in resource  use, it is likely
receiving  food  stamps  have  gross  annual  that  the  rigid  regulatory  structures  for  some
incomes  below the poverty line.  More than  commodities  historically  associated  with  south-
half have  gross  incomes  of  $3600  or  less;  ern  agriculture  will  need  to  change,  and  those
three-fourths  have  incomes  below  $4800.  changes undoubtedly  will be controversial.
The  participant  households  with  incomes  In  particular,  the  growing  pressures  on  the
above the poverty line tend to be elderly or  cropland  base  make  it  likely  that  the  existing
working poor.  commodity  programs  for peanuts,  tobacco,  rice
and ELS cotton will not be retained in their pres-
2.  Across  the  board  benefit  cuts,  while  the  ent form much  longer.  These programs  probably
7will  be  extended  without  much  change  in  the  will  be extremely  important to  southern  agricul-
1981 farm bill. Primarily,  I believe,  that will hap-  ture. And the pressures for change in these areas,
pen  because  of the  changes  stemming  from  the  as  with  the  commodity  programs,  seem  to  be
1980  elections  (a  new  secretary  of  agriculture,  running counter to the narrow special interests of
and new  chairmen  of the  Senate  and  House  Ag-  producers in the region.
riculture  Committees).  But the  economic  forces
that are building  are unmistakable.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS
These same  pressures  are also likely to gener-
ate proposals for change in other production con-  It  is  critical to  keep agricultural  policy  in per-
trol  methods-even  those for  the  major grains.  spective.  While  there  are  still frequent  debates
The  potential  for  variability  that  now  exists  in  about  the  wisdom  of past  actions,  history  re-
annual  production  and  exports  makes  it  likely  minds us that the performance of the sector, par-
that  temporary  production  controls  for  such  ticularly in this century,  has been good.  Farmers
commodities  may again be needed.  It will be dif-  have  benefited  less from  past programs  than  is
ficult for farmers or the Congress to focus on that  generally  believed;  consumers  (and  taxpayers)
fact in a year  following  a major drought.  In this  have benefited  more  than is generally  admitted.
regard,  it  is  significant  that  southern  farmers  And partisan politics has not been very impor-
were  able  to  convince  Congress  to  withdraw  tant. In the main, policy changes have responded
funding for operation of the Normal Crop  Acre-  to changing economic  pressures. Today,  primar-
age  (NCA) for  1981  even with strong opposition  ily  because  it  is  necessary  for  improved  eco-
from USDA.  Just how farmers would respond  to  nomic  efficiency,  more  importance  is  being
proposals  that  would  eliminate  set-aside  or  di-  placed  on  the  allocative  functions  that  can  be
version  authority  is  still uncertain,  performed  by  prices;  there  is  significantly  less
The potential for change in dairy policy is also  government  interference  with  producers'  deci-
important  to  southern  agriculture.  The  federal  sion  making than  was the case  a  decade  ago.
order program  has doubtlessly  enhanced  the  in-  Agricultural  policy  changes  in  the  future  will
comes  of southern  dairy  farmers.  After  all,  this  build  on  this  tradition.  More  attention  will  be
has  traditionally  been  afluid milk  market.  But  given  to  programs  that  stabilize  commodity
southern  dairy  farmers  also  have  an  important  prices  and  farm  income.  Programs  that  control
economic  stake in  continuation of the price  sup-  production  and  artificially  raise  prices  will  be
port program.  changed.  Such programs  will  come into  increas-
Farmers  in the  South  will  also be  affected  by  ing conflict  with broader  national  economic  pol-
decisions  on  grain  reserve  and  export  policy.  icy  objectives  and  with  producers'  own  eco-
Southern agriculture  is  a large user of feedgrain,  nomic  self-interest.
and  much  of it  is  imported from  outside  the  re-  For agriculture,  as for the rest of the economy,
gion.  Unless  policy  actions  to  moderate  grain  the  broadest  of all  policy  challenges  will  be  to
price volatility are extended, the livestock sector  find new and more flexible ways to use resources
in  the  region  faces  the  prospect  of  conditions  efficiently,  while  at  the  same  time  protecting
more  volatile than  during the  1970s.  against the potentially destabilizing effects of ex-
Perhaps  the  most  important  issues  are  those  treme  price  volatility.  There  are  some  difficult
being raised  regarding  the subsidization of input  policy choices ahead,  but that is where food  and
use.  Water,  land  use,  and  transportation  policy  agricultural policy  is headed  in the  1980s.
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